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Abstract: After reform and opening up, China is experiencing rapid economic growth 
but inefficient public services provision. Public education expenditure-to-GDP ratio is 
too low to keep sustainable growth of China’s social and economic development. Some 
scholars believe that fiscal decentralization is an important reason. Firstly, this paper 
analyzes the main factors and path of how fiscal decentralization affects public 
education provision. While the 1994 tax-sharing reform raised the fiscal revenue of 
central government, it also increased the fiscal expenditure burden of local governments. 
Under local officials’ yard-stick competition regime, fiscal decentralization on 
expenditure may make local governments tend to allocate fiscal expenditure in 
infrastructure, to attract outside capital to develop local economy, but in the same time, 
reduce provision of public services, such as education, which has positive externalities. 
Then, empirical tests based on 1996-2007 prefectural jurisdications panel-data verifies 
that this phenomenon does exist in China. Further empirical tests make comparisons 
among different regions and we find that negative effect of fiscal decentralization on 
public education provision is the highest in Cenral and West China, and the lowest in 
Northeast China. At last, according to the analysis and empirical results, we give policy 
proposals on how to improve the public education provision in China. 
Key words: Fiscal Decentralization; Tax-Sharing Reform; Public Education Provision; 
Externalities; Panel Data 
 
Résumé:  Après la réforme et l'ouverture, la Chine connaît une croissance économique 
rapide mais une provision de services publics inefficace. Les dépenses en éducation 
publique par rapport au PIB est trop faible pour maintenir la croissance durable du 
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développement social et économique de la Chine. Certains chercheurs pensent que la 
décentralisation fiscale est une raison importante. Tout d'abord, cet article analyse les 
facteurs principaux et la façon dont la décentralisation fiscale affecte l'offre d'éducation 
publique. Tandis que la réforme de partage des recettes fiscales de 1994 a soulevé les 
revenus fiscaux du gouvernement central, elle a également augmenté le fardeau fiscal 
des gouvernements locaux. Sous le régime de concurrence des fonctionnaires locaux, la 
décentralisation fiscale sur les dépenses peut inciter les gouvernements locaux à allouer 
des dépenses fiscales dans les infrastructures, afin d'attirer des capitaux extérieurs pour 
développer l'économie locale, et à réduire en même temps l'offre de services poublics, 
telle que l'éducation, qui a des externalités positives. Ensuite, des tests empiriques basés 
sur les données de panel receuillies des jurisdications préfectorales de1996-2007 
montrent que ce phénomène existe réellement en Chine. Des tests empiriques 
approfondis font des comparaisons entre des régions différentes et nous constatons que 
les effets négatifs les plus importants de la décentralisation fiscale sur l'offre d'éducation 
publique sont dans le centre et l'ouest de la Chine, et les plus faibles sont dans le nord-est 
de la Chine. Enfin, conformément à l'analyse et aux résultats empiriques, nous donnons 
des propositions de politiques sur la façon d'améliorer l'offre d'éducation publique en 
Chine. 
Mots-cles: décentralisation fiscal; réforme de partage des recettes fiscales; offre 
d'éducation publique; externalités; données de panel 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no doubt that, as an important human resources output industry of China’s economic and social 
development, education is always being highly concerned by central government. The absolute value of 
public education expenditure is increasing from 86.78 billion yuan in 1993 to 869.08 billion yuan in 2007, 
and it has increased by 10 times in 15 years. However, if we look at relative value we can find that, public 
education expenditure-to-GDP ratio is always below 3.5% (see Figure 1), and it is much less than the world 
average of 4.6%. Shortage of education is harmful to socio-economic sustainable development of China. In 
May 2010, the State Council pointed out in "State Long-term Education Reform and Development Plan 
(2010-2020)", that fiscal education expenditure-GDP ratio should be increased to 4% in 2012. Therefore, 
we need to find out main factors for education provision shortage in China in public finance regime, and 
this issue is critical for China’s social and economic sustainable development in the next few decades and 
even in longer term. 
 
Figure 1:  China’s Public Education Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio and Total Expenditure (1978-2007) 
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One of the most important features of China’s tax-sharing fiscal regime is fiscal decentralization. The 
definition of fiscal decentralization is that, central government decentralizes some fiscal authoritie to local 
governments. If the authorities of local government has reached a certain level, we can say that this country 
is fiscal decentralized. 
Some scholars believe that fiscal decentralization is an important reason of the decrease of public 
education provision. Busemeyer (2008) uses a pooled-data of 21 OECD countries analysis, and finds out 
that fiscal decentralization decreases public education expenditures at national level but increases public 
education spending at regional level. Lu and Li (2006) develop a linear model which is derived from utility 
function, through empirical test, they believe that financial decentralization has caused the backwardness of 
rural compulsory education, and has widened the gap between urban and rural educations. However, their 
utility function models assume that government is "benevolent", which does not meet the current theory of 
fiscal decentralization in the field of incentive compatible framework. Moreover, existing studies are based 
on the data above provincial level, but using provincial and national data ignores the "concentrated down" 
feature of China’s public education expenditure – fiscal education expenditure of local governments takes a 
large proportion. Thus, our research tries to enrich the theoretical and empirical literature of this issue. 
Therefore, this paper analyses main factors of education provision shortage from the perspective of 
public financial regime, and then after panel-date regression empirical tests, we provide policy proposals 
according to empirical test results. Main contributions and innovations of this paper are: Using all of the 
prefectural jurisdictions panel data in China to make this research more detailed; using UNESCO uniform 
education provision indicators; Comparing public education provisions in different regions (East, Middle, 
West and Northeast). 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 and 3 briefly analyse two main factors of how fiscal 
decentralization reduces public education provision. Section 4 summarizes impact path of fiscal 
decentralization on public education provision. Section 5 describes data and regression model. Sections 6 
presents empirical analysis results, and Section 7 concludes and provides policy proposals. 
 
2. DECENTRALIZED PUBLIC FINANCE REGIME AND 
EDUCATION FINANCE REGIME 
 
Since 80s of 20th century, federal index, which is the degree of decentralization, has increased steadily in 
most developed, developing and transition countries. In fiscal expenditure side, China is one of the most 
decentralized countries in the world, and local governments should bear more than 70% of the expenditure 
responsibility in recent years. However, this number is only about 15% in developing countries, and about 
26% in transition countries, even in OECD countries it is only about 32%. Therefore, Wang (1997) believes 
that China is over decentralized. 
What make things worse, major responsibilities fall on local governments in China, in many areas, in 
which central government should take major responsibilities. For example, Wong and Deepak (2003) point 
out that China’s education expenditure regime is over decentralized. 90% of China's education expenditure 
is taken by local governments, and 70% happens in the governments below prefectural level, which is 
different from international common structure of education expenditure, and proportion of local 
government expenditure is higher. Central government accounts for a relatively higher proportion of 
education expenditure in major unitary countries, while local governments take a lower proportion, which 
is 35.3% in average (see Table 1). They believe that this may lead to distortion in government expenditure 
structure. 
First-generation theory of fiscal decentralization4 believes that, market failure occurs in the provision of 
public goods and public services with positive externalities, which is usually called "tragedy of the 
                                                 
4 The first-generation theory of fiscal decentralization comes from AMS public economics theory which contains 
research of Paul A. Samuelson, Richard A. Musgrave and Kenneth J. Arrow in the 50s of 20th century. In addition, 
Tiebout (1956) also creates an effective theory, however, the basic assumptions of his theory is too strong that this 
theory cannot be used in other countries. 
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commons5". So the government should enter these areas, and correct these market failures through 
appropriate policies. As public service with positive externalities, if education is only provided by the 
market, the equilibrium value will be less than the social optimum. What’s more, the first-generation theory 
of fiscal decentralization believes that the beneficiaries of education are all of the citizens in the region6, 
and the local governments could understand local conditions better than central government. Therefore, 
providing local public goods by local governments will make local citizens “better-off” than providing 
local public goods uniformly by the central government. Fiscal decentralization theory of Tiebout (1956) 
was very famous and influencial, but his theory is based on several restricted assumptions, and cannot be 
used in countries outside United States, as he said. For example, “Hukou” system in China prevents a lot of 
population from moving to other regions, which is not consistent with basic assumptions of Tiebout model. 
However, second-generation theory of fiscal decentralization believes that appropriate incentive 
mechanisms must be designed to ensure that local government has sufficient incentives to provide efficient 
public goods and public services (Oates, 2005; Qian and Weingast, 1997). The largest difference between 
second-generation and first-generation theories of fiscal decentralization is that, second-generation theory 
holds the thinking that governments are not pure “Guardians of Public Interests”, they concern about their 
own private interests, and behavior distortions may occur if there is no restriction for local officials. 
Therefore, an efficient government structure should fulfill the incentive compatibility between local 
governments and local citizens’ welfare. But without appropriate incentive regime constraints, citizens can 
not enjoy benefits of fiscal decentralization, but are “worse-off” because of distorted behaviors of local 
governments (Luo, 2010). China is centralized in politics, but decentralized in fiscal regime and 
administration regime, whether such government structure is able to restrict the self-interest of local 
government officials, and whether it is able to promote local economic development and local public 
services, are both worth being studied. 
Table 1:  Education Expenditure (%) Distribution among All Levels of Governments, in Major 
Countries 
Federal 
Counties 
Share of Education Expenditure Unitary Countries Share of Education ExpenditureCentral State Local Central Local 
Australia 8.5 91.3 0.2 France 75.3 24.7 
Canada 4.8 34.5 60.7 United Kingdom 12.7 87.3 
Germany 1.0 73.8 25.2 Denmark 46.8 53.2 
Switzerland 6.2 57.5 36.3 Kenya 94.0 6.0 
US 4.2 24.5 71.3 Thailand 94.8 5.2 
Unweighted 
Average 4.9 56.3 38.7 
Unweighted 
Average 64.7 35.3 
 
 
3. POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES OF EDUCATION AND 
COMPETITION AMONG REGIONS 
 
The second factor is positive externalities of education. Definitely, people can benefit a lot from education, 
especially from its internal influences. Haveman and Wolfe (1984) points out five types of internal 
influences of education, for instance, it leads to higher wage and human capital efficiency. On the other 
hand, education has positive externalities. In economic theories, the definition of positive externalities is: 
some behaviors have spillover effects on other people or public interest, but the beneficiaries do not have to 
compensate. People can get private benefit and generate social benefit when they are in education. They can 
not only improve themselves, but also increase the social productivity and the degree of social civilization 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). 
                                                 
5 Tragedy of the commons: Because property rights of public goods are difficult to define (high transaction costs of 
defining their property rights), they are usually over-used or encroached. 
6 Of course, this argument deserves further discussion. 
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However, the positive externalities of education will cause reduction of provision of education. 
Specifically, if education is provided by market, the equilibrium value of education provision is probably 
lower than social optimum (Zhao, 2008). Therefore, the main provider of education should be government.  
The inter-regional relationship in China is competition but not cooperation (Shen and Fu, 2006), and the 
competition among regions makes local governments more inclined to invest in infrastructure to attract 
outside capital, but not willing to invest in public services, such as education, to prevent spillover effects of 
public services investment. For example, education can improve the degree of civilization of local citizens, 
and then decrease crime rate of adjacent regions. Additionally, educated citizens may be employed in other 
regions. The objective of local government officials is to internalize investment benefit as much as possible. 
If we take a region as an rational individual, when local governments think that if they invest in education to 
themselves, some of the investment benefit will be externalized, the regions will all decrease investment in 
education. Calabrese et al (2009) finds that, fiscal decentralization causes lower efficiency of public 
services, and they consider the positive externalities of public services as the main reason. 
 
4.  HOW DOES FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AFFECT 
PUBLIC EDUCATION PROVISION: THE PATH 
 
In our current economic situation, to promote economic development, local governments can invest 
directly in infrastructure7 or in provision of public services. However, since 80s of 20th century, in 
evaluation criteria of yard-stick competition among local government officials, the most important "fixed 
target" is economic growth, especially GDP growth rate, while public services are lower ranked as "soft 
target", such as education, health care, etc. In the constraints of fiscal capacity, local government officials 
must make choice between infrastructure investment and public services provision. 
In this selection process, local officials usually choose to maximize "political achievements", rather 
than maximize local public interest, because they are assigned by upper governments but not voted by local 
citizens, that is also an important reason for rapid economic growth and low efficiencies of local public 
service provisions (Zhou, 2007).As long as the investment is beneficial to maximize their "political 
achievements", local officials will strive to provide. In general, investment in infrastructure can contribute 
directly in GDP, and can attract outside capital and promote local economic development, thus, 
infrastructure investment will become the first choice for local officials. On the other hand, public services 
such as education and healthcare needs more fiscal expenditure but can provide less “political 
achievements”, so local governments are not willing to provide public services. 
China’s fiscal decentralization can stimulate enthusiasm of local governments for economic 
developement, but inappropriate decentralization degree intensifies competition among regions, and then 
leads to distortion of local government behaviors. In decentralized fiscal expenditure regime and 
decentralized education expenditure regime, local governments have more power to determine education 
expenditures. However, education has positive externalities, the investment in education will not only bring 
return to local citizens, but also cause benefit to other regions. Therefore, under fiscal decentralization and 
blind pursuit of local officials for "political achievements", "vacancy" and "offside" behaviors of local 
governments will occur, such as over-investment in competitive areas, like infrastructure, but 
under-investment of basic public services. Ultimately, these factors will result in inadequate supply of local 
public services, for example, in education area. 
What fiscal decentralization brings is incentive for self-interest of local governments. This incentive is 
necessary for local economic growth. However, maximization of local governments’ utilities, does not 
necessarily lead to maximization of local citizens’ utilities, because local governments are not necessarily 
representatives of local citizens; and, maximization of local citizens’s utilities in each region does not lead 
to maximization of population’s utilities in nationwide, because when each region competes with each 
other for its own benefit, “prisoners’ dilemma” may happen, and it will bring damage to each region. 
                                                 
7 In this paper, infrastructure is “hardware infrastructure” which can attract outside capital, and do not include 
education, health and other public services. 
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After clarifying the path of how fiscal decentralization affect public education provision, we examine 
whether this situation exists in China through empirical tests based on panel-data of all prefectural 
jurisdictions (including prefectural cities, prefectures, Autonomous regions and Leagues) 1996-2007. 
 
5.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL TEST 
5.1  Dependent Variables 
In this paper, we use indicators used uniformly in "World Education Report" and "Education Statistical 
Yearbook" published by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) as 
indicators of public education provision and denoted by EDU. 
(1) Public education expenditure-to-GDP ratio; 
(2) Public education expenditure-to-total government expenditure ratio; 
(3) Public education expenditure per student. 
 
5.2  Independent Variables 
We construct fiscal decentralization (indicated as FD) as: prefectural expenditure per person/consolidated 
expenditure per person, to measure the degree of fiscal power of this prefectural jurisdiction government. 
The formula of FD is: 
 
ijt
ijt
ijt m
it ijtijt j t
ijt it t
PRX
P
FD
PX PRXPRX CX
P P P
  
 (1) 
In this formula, i denotes province i, j denotes prefectural jurisdiction j in province i, t denotes year t. 
ijtFD  denotes fiscal authorities of prefectural jurisdiction j in province i in year t, ijtPRX  denotes fiscal 
expenditure of prefectural jurisdiction j in province i in year t, ijtP  denotes population of prefectural 
jurisdiction j in province i in year t. Therefore, /ijt ijtPRX P  denotes fiscal expenditure per person of 
prefectural jurisdiction j in province i in year t. itPX  denotes fiscal expenditure of province i in year t, itP  
denotes population of province i in year t, tCX  denotes central fiscal expenditure in year t, tP  is 
population in year t. Therefore, /it itPX P  denotes fiscal expenditure per person of province i in year t, 
/t tCX P  denotes fiscal expenditure per person in year t8. 0 1FD  , the closer to 1 FD  is, the more 
fiscal authorities of this prefectural jurisdiction has. 
 
The economic sense of this indicator is that: /ijt ijtPRX P  denotes the fiscal expenditure prefectural 
jurisdiction j in province i spend on one person in year t, 
m
ijt
j
PRX  denotes summer of fiscal expenditures 
of all m prefectural jurisdictions in province i in year t, 
 mit ijtj
it
PX PRX
P

 is provincial government 
fiscal expenditure spend on one person in province i in year t, therefore, 
                                                 
8 The assumption here is that fiscal expenditure is spent equally on each citizen at all levels of jurisdictions. 
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 mit ijtjijt t
ijt it t
PX PRXPRX CX
P P P

   denotes the fiscal expenditure spent on one person of the whole 
country in year t. 
Thus, ijtFD  denotes the share of fiscal expenditure spent on this person of prefecture j in the fiscal 
expenditure spent on this same person of the whole country in year t. By using this indicator, we can get rid 
of population effect in fiscal expenditure and effect of grant transfers from central government to local 
governments, and fully denotes the share of local government fiscal power. Many scholars have used this 
indicator (Ying, 2004; Qiao et al, 2005). 
Other control variables are: 
(1) GDP per capita in prefecture: economic development affects education provision. We take natural 
logarithm of per capita GDP to reflect economic development, denoted by LNGDPPC; 
(2) Public expenditure-to-GDP ratio in prefecture: denoted by PE_GDP; 
(3) Number of Students in School in prefecture: to control demand for education, denoted by TS; 
(4) Year dummy variables: to control different education and public finance policies each year9, 
denoted by D= [D1, D2,...D11]. 
 
5.3  Data Descriptions 
The panel data we use is all prefectural regions in China from 1996 to 2007 (including urban and rural areas; 
excluding four municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing 10 , and excluding Taiwan, 
Hongkong and Macau), 12 years, 3980 observations in all11. 
Data sources are: Fiscal Data Statistics of All Prefectures, Cities and Counties in China (1997-2008), 
China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy (2000-2008), and Statistical Yearbooks of all provinces 
(1997-2008). The description statistics of all variables are in Table 2. 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of All Variables (Dummy Variables Omitted) 
Variables Observations Average Std. Err. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variables 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-Total 
Expenditure Ratio 
3978 20.0544 5.4209 2.0152 41.7126 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-GDP 
Ratio 
3978 2.4032 1.9294 0.1223 17.6481 
Public Education 
Expenditure per 
Student 
3978 1194.8033 905.5112 120.3599 24042.0002
Independent 
Variables 
Fiscal Decentralization 3980 0.5068 0.1275 0.2097 0.9795 
Natural Logarithm of 
GDP per Capita 3980 8.9393 0.7677 6.7530 11.4968 
Fiscal Expenditure as 
Share of GDP 3980 12.3157 10.1178 1.3841 94.7462 
Total Students in 
School 3980 59.3957 42.0391 3.8300 242.5697 
 
 
                                                 
9 There are 12 years, therefore, 11 dummy variables are needed. 
10 Municipalities are special, so regression results can be more objective by excluding municipalities. 
11 As in these 12 years, China's prefecture level jurisdictions have changed, from 324 in 1996, to 334 in 2007; and there 
are some name changes. These changes have been considered, therefore, it is an unbalanced panel data model. In 
regression, because of some data defect, there will be some reduction of the amount of observations. 
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5.4  Regression Model 
In the regression model, individuals are all prefectures in China, time is year. Panel data regression model 
can overcome multi-collinearity problem, and provide more information, more freedom degree and higher 
estimate efficiency. Statistical software is STATA 11. 
The panel data regression model is: 
0 1 2 3 4_ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijtEDU FD GDPPC PE GDP TSLN D                (2) 
In panel-data regression model, to avoid false regression, we need to analyze stability of data series by 
unit root test12. The null hypothesis H0 is that unit root exists. Fisher test rejects null hypothesis at 5% 
significance level, so all data series are stationary (see Table 3). 
Table 3:  Unit Root Test Results of Data 
Variables 2χ  Statistic P-Value 
Dependent 
Variables 
Public Education Expenditure-to-Total 
Expenditure Ratio 1639.31 0.0000 
Public Education Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio 1045.25 0.0000 
Public Education Expenditure per Student 962.94 0.0000 
Independent 
Variables 
Fiscal Decentralization 745.09 0.0209 
Natural Logarithm of GDP per Capita 739.83 0.0276 
Fiscal Expenditure as Share of GDP 990.94 0.0000 
Total Students in School 1134.12 0.0000 
 
By covariance analysis (F statistic) to identify the model type, we find that it should be variable 
intercept model, which means "there is no significant difference in marginal effect of fiscal decentralization 
on education provision among regions, but education provision varies among regions." In addition, 
regression model should be fixed-effects panel-data model, because some unobservable factors should be 
controled for different prefectures. Hausman test also reveals that it should be fixed-effects model. 
 
6.  EMPIRICAL TEST RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.1  International Comparison 
First of all, we make international comparisons. Public education expenditure-to-GDP ratio dropped from 
the highest point of 3.49% in 1984 to the lowest of 2.32% in 1995, and then slowly rose to 3.32% in 2007. 
As we can see from Table 4, 3.32% is closed to the level of low-income countries (GNI per capita 
$976-$3855), even lower than the average of Latin America and the Caribbean countries 3.5% and 
Sub-Saharan African countries 4.1%. 
Table 4:  Public Education Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio (%) in Some Countries in the World, in the 
Year of 2007, Grouped by Income and Region 
Country, Grouped by Income Public Education Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio
Country, 
Grouped by 
Region 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-GDP 
Ratio (%) 
Middle-Income 4.5% Europe and Middle East 4.1% 
Lower Middle Income 3.2% Europe 5.2% 
Upper Middle Income 4.5% 
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
3.5% 
To be continued 
                                                 
12 Unit root test in STATA is Fisher test. Fisher test is a combination of multiple unit root tests. 
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Continued 
Country, Grouped by Income Public Education Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio
Country, 
Grouped by 
Region 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-GDP 
Ratio (%) 
High Income 5.1% Sub-Saharan Africa 4.1% 
World Average 4.6% World Average 4.6% 
Source: World Development Indicator 2009 
 
6.2  Inter-regional Comparisons 
Then we look into the situation of different regions in China (see Figure 2), and we can see that public 
education expenditure-to-total expenditure ratio is the highest in eastern regions, then central regions, and 
northeast and western regions are the lowest; public education expenditure-to-GDP ratio is the highest in 
western regions, then central and northeast regions, and eastern regions is the lowest (see Figure 3); while 
public education expenditure per student is the highest in central regions (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 2:  Provincial Public Education Expenditure-to-Total Expenditure Ratio 1996-2007, Annual 
Average, Excluding Four Municipalities (%) 
 
 
Figure 3:  Provincial Public Education Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio 1996-2007, Annual Average, 
Excluding Four Municipalities (%) 
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Figure 4:  Provincial Public Education Expenditure per Student 1996-2007, Annual Average, 
Excluding Four Municipalities (yuan) 
 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) results also show that the description of statistical conclusion above is 
not false (see Table 5). Comparisons of different indicators show different comparison results, which is 
probably due to higher GDP in eastern region and lower GDP in western region. Therefore, we need to use 
indicators as a group, and detailed analysis to get conclusions. 
Table 5:  Comparison of Public Education Provision in Different Regions in China, Analysis of 
Variance 
Region Observations 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-Total 
Expenditure Ratio 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-GDP 
Ratio 
Public Education 
Expenditure per 
Student 
Average Rank Average Rank Average Rank 
East 84 20.60 1 1.88 4 1320.45 1 
Central 72 19.54 2 2.25 2 899.73 4 
West 132 17.25 3 3.72 1 1291.43 1 
Northeast 36 17.28 3 2.30 2 1315.38 1 
 
6.3  Results of Regression Model 
Empirical test results of regression model are in Table 6 (because of limited space, year dummy variables 
regression results omitted; F test indicates the panel data model is significant; t test statistics corresponding 
to coefficients are in the parentheses). 
As we can see from Table 6, fiscal decentralization significantly reduces public education 
expenditure-to-total expenditure ratio and public education expenditure-to-GDP ratio. If the degree of 
fiscal decentralization increases 1 percent, public education expenditure-to-total expenditure ratio 
decreases 0.301 percent, public education expenditure-to-GDP ratio decreases 0.021 percent, public 
education expenditure per student decreases 3.758 yuan. This empirical result is consistent with the analysis 
and conclusions of theoretical model above: fiscal decentralization significantly reduces public education 
provision. The greater fiscal expenditure authorities local governments have, the more local government 
officials are inclined to allocate fiscal expenditure to areas like infrastructure but not education and other 
public services. Therefore, the expenditure allocated to education definitely decreases. 
In control variables, GDP per capita significantly increases public education provision at 1% 
significance level, which indicates that, economic development could enhance education, although local 
government may over-invest in infrastructure and under-invest in education to accelerate economic 
development. Public expenditure-to-GDP ratio also significantly increases public education provision, 
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which means education provision will increase with the increase of fiscal expenditure in prefectural cities 
and regions. Total students in school is only significant positively related to public education expenditure 
per capita, but not related to relative size of education provision. 
Table 6:  Empirical Test Results (Results of Year Dummy Variables Omitted) 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
Name Abbreviation 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-Total 
Expenditure Ratio 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-GDP 
Ratio 
Public Education 
Expenditure per 
Student 
Fiscal 
Decentralization FD 
-30.11*** -2.07*** -375.75* 
(-11.75) (-8.35) (-1.69) 
Natural Logarithm 
of GDP per Capita LNGDPPC 
1.05* 0.31*** 530.13*** 
(1.76) (5.36) (12.09) 
Total Expenditure as 
Share of GDP PE_GDP 
0.04*** 0.12*** 36.21*** 
(6.50) (44.37) (11.81) 
Total Students in 
School TS 
-0.0006 -0.0011 3.8988*** 
(-0.10) (-1.47) (7.87) 
Constant _cons 31.75*** 4.76*** -4087.15*** (6.53) (10.13) (-12.41) 
R2  0.47 0.83 0.68 
Observations  3978 3978 3978 
***Significant at 1% Significant Level; **Significant at 5% Significant Level; *Significant at 10% 
Significant Level 
 
6.4  Results of Regional Comparisons in Regression Model 
Next, for further research, we divide China into four regions: eastern, central, western and northeast regions. 
Table 7 shows marginal effect of fiscal decentralization on public education provision in prefectural cities 
and regions in East, Central, West and Northeast China (control variables omitted because of limited 
space). 
Table 7:  Empirical Test Results in Different Regions (Results of Control Variables Ommited) 
Region 
Dependent Variables 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-Total 
Expenditure Ratio 
Public Education 
Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio 
Public Education 
Expenditure per Student 
Eastern -24.84*** -2.70*** -248.34 (-9.36) (-11.13) (-0.41) 
R2 0.60 0.67 0.71 
Observations 1008 1008 1008 
Central -34.69*** -3.22*** -755.35*** (-10.33) (-8.36) (-3.22) 
R2 0.59 0.86 0.91 
Observations 989 989 989 
Western -28.99*** -4.06*** -643.42** (-5.24) (-7.92) (-2.26) 
R2 0.39 0.84 0.74 
Observations 1549 1549 1549 
Northeast -17.10*** 1.73** 1249.72*** (-3.53) (2.52) (2.80) 
R2 0.67 0.74 0.82 
Observations 432 432 432 
***Significant at 1% Significant Level; **Significant at 5% Significant Level; *Significant at 10% 
Significant Level 
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As we can see from Table 7, in four regions, fiscal decentralization reduces education provision by 
various degrees. The marginal negative effect of fiscal decentralization on education provision is the 
highest in central and western regions. In central region, if degree of fiscal decentralization increases 1 
percent, public education expenditure-to-total expenditure ratio decreases 0.347 percent, public education 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio decreases 0.032 percent, and public education expenditure per student decreases 
7.554 yuan. In western region, if the degree of decentralization increases 1 percent, public education 
expenditure-to-total expenditure ratio decreases 0.290 percent, public education expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
decreases 0.041 percent, and public education expenditure per student decreases 6.434 yuan. Eastern region 
is in the middle. In eastern region, if the degree of decentralization increases 1 percent, public education 
expenditure-to-total expenditure ratio decreases 0.248 percent, and public education expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio decreases 0.027 percent, public education expenditure per student does not significantly change. The 
marginal effect of fiscal decentralization on education provision is the lowest in northeastern region. 
Possible reason of the results above is that, although the economic growth is not slow in western region 
in recent years, however, previous economic foundation is too weak in western region, so if western 
prefectures have more fiscal power, fund is still over-invested in infrastructure to attract outside capital to 
enhance economic development. Thus, education and other public services are neglected. Central region is 
facing similar problems. What’s make things worse, outflow of human capital is higher in central and 
western regions, therefore, incentive for local governments to develop education is quite weak there. 
Eastern region is the most economically developed area in China, but also need to undertake the 
pressure of economic development. In current yard-stick competition regime, local officials could 
relatively neglect education. Relatively, northeastern region has higher economic development than central 
and western regions, in the same time, it does not undertake as much pressure as eastern region in economic 
development. That is a reason why fiscal decentralization has the lowest negative effects on public 
education provision in northeastern region. In addition, different economic and fiscal policies from central 
government to different regions is another important reason. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY PROPOSALS 
 
Education can improve the overall quality of population, and more importantly, it has long-term positive 
effects on the entire country, both on the economy and society. In China, the education expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio is too low, what makes things worse, decentralized fiscal regime decreases public education provision. 
This paper discusses how the decentralized tax-sharing regime affects public education provision, and 
find out that fiscal decentralization decreases the public education provision, through empirical test based 
on panel data of all prefectural cities and regions 1996-2007, we verify that this phenomenon exists in 
China. 
The degree of fiscal decentralization significantly decreases public education provision. Education has 
positive externalities, so investment in education by local governments will benefit both local citizens and 
other regions. In addition, decentralizing most of the education responsibility to local governments is 
inconsistent with most countries of the world. If local governments have greater autonomy in fiscal 
expenditure, it will reduce investment in education because of positive externalities of education provision. 
Therefore, it is necessary to retrieve some education responsibilities back to central government. 
While fiscal decentralization increases enthusiasm and autonomy of local governments, it also brings 
negative effects on local public services. In fact, except for education, the under-investment in public 
service is also observed in other areas of local public services, such as healthcare and environment (Luo, 
2010), which are also important to people’s life. 
From public finance regime, to improve population welfare, central government should alleviate some 
expenditure burden of local governments, and increase the revenue for them, to re-balance between 
decentralization and centralization, and relieve vertical fiscal imbalance of China’s public finance regime; 
or subsidize public services input of local governments through direct transfer payments, especially for 
western region. Division of expenditure responsibilities should be clarified, and should include which 
public goods and services should be provided by each level of government. The public goods and services 
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benefited by the whole national population should be provided exclusively by central government; local 
government should provide public goods and services benefited by local residents; in public projects with 
"externalities", central government should be involved. What’s more, local government officials’ 
performance assessment regime needs to be adjusted to prevent fierce yard-stick competition, by reducing 
the relative importance of GDP growth rate to public services. If all of those policy proposals above can be 
finished, the problem of shortage of public education and other public services will be resolved essentially. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
Figure 1  China’s Public Education Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio and Total Expenditure (1978-2007) 
Figure 2   Provincial Public Education Expenditure-to-Total Expenditure Ratio 1996-2007, Annual 
Average, Excluding Four Municipalities 
Figure 3   Provincial Public Education Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio 1996-2007, Annual Average, Excluding 
Four Municipalities 
Figure 4   Provincial Public Education Expenditure per Student 1996-2007, Annual Average, Excluding 
Four Municipalities 
 
